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Abstract 
The reception of phenomenology in art criticism reached its apex in the mid-1960s in its 
application to Minimalism in the United States. The focus was on the embodied, direct 
perceptual experience of Minimalist sculpture, but in light of Conceptual art’s 
‘dematerialised’ practices, which developed as the decade progressed, the interest in 
phenomenology waned. This paper looks at the history of this reception and presents 
Merleau-Ponty’s late ontological work as a corrective to an inadequate understanding of 
phenomenology in critical discourses on art at the time. It argues that the late Merleau-Ponty 
offers tools for an effective critique of early conceptualism’s idealism, as well as a basis on 
which the ‘dematerialised’ and dispersed ontology of the art work shared by both Conceptual 
and more recent Post-Conceptual practices can be investigated. 
1. Phenomenology After Conceptual Art 
In his article “A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects” the artist Robert Smithson 
described a visit to the slate quarries of Bangor-Pen Angyl in Pennsylvania. Contemplating a 
wall of rock reflected in a murky lake, he wrote of how “all boundaries and distinctions lost 
their meaning in this ocean of slate and collapsed all notions of gestalt unity” 
(Smithson 1996, 100). Smithson’s article was published in September 1968 in Artforum, an 
art journal that between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s carried a series of historically 
important statements by Robert Morris, Sol LeWitt, Mel Bochner, and Joseph Kosuth, 
among others. We are on the cusp of Conceptual art’s heyday in New York, the city from 
which Smithson ventured out on field trips to sites in the industrial and suburban margins. 
Among his companions on this particular outing are his wife, the sculptor Nancy Holt, and 
Dan Graham, whose photo-text work “Homes for America” (published in Arts Magazine two 
years prior to this trip) was to become a canonical early example of conceptualism. On other 
trips the company included the chief practitioners of Minimal art: Carl André, Donald Judd 
and Robert Morris. The latter two were not only active makers, they were also artists who 
wrote and whose writings have continued to have more or less as much influence as their 
works. However, there is a difference between Judd and Morris on the one hand and 
Smithson and Graham on the other. Whilst the former would not have seen their writing as 
art, the latter explicitly did. 
Minimalism and Conceptual art were so closely related in this milieu as to resemble siblings, 
if not twins in some respects. There was no significant generational divide between their 
early proponents. Nonetheless, there was an historical and philosophical caesura between 
them, and this can be located symptomatically in their attitudes to “notions of gestalt unity” 
and the phenomenological stance implied in Smithson’s phrase. Phenomenology’s critical 
stock was high during the first half of the decade, but fell as the focus shifted from the 
situated perception of the object in Minimalism to the dematerialisation of the object with 
Conceptual art. What this paper looks at are phenomenology’s vacillating theoretical and 
critical fortunes in this context. It does this with the aim of speculating on the possibility of 
bringing phenomenological ideas back to bear on contemporary Post-conceptual art. 
In an interview Robert Smithson gave the year after publishing “Sedimentation,” the artist 
spoke of considering “the facile unitary or gestalt ideas part of the expressive fallacy” 
(Lippard 1977, 89). It would be reasonable to suppose that, at least in part, he was 
responding to the ideas espoused by his friend Robert Morris who held that the human 
body determines the perception of scale and should be the measure for sculpture, a 
viewpoint which itself was based on the phenomenological idea that the world gave itself to 
be grasped as a gestalt (Morris 1995, 11). Smithson is diametrically opposed to Morris here, 
as he says: “You just have to deal with the fundamentals of matter and mind, completely 
devoid of any anthropomorphic interests” (Lippard 1977, 89). By and large, it seems to be 
Morris’s version of phenomenology that Smithson is rejecting here. 
However, some things about Smithson should make us think twice about the prevalent view 
that there is an incompatibility between phenomenology and conceptualism. Primarily, 
Smithson did not reduce art to information or concept, nor to the discourse or text of post-
modern criticism; he resists such reduction because “the interaction between matter and 
mind” is what his work was about (Lippard 1977, 89). It is true, nonetheless, that this 
interaction certainly is not synonymous with that which phenomenology classically 
entertained; it is not a question of intentionality and intentional objects. Regarding his site 
visits and the ‘nonsite’ gallery works he subsequently produced abstractly mapping them, 
Smithson spoke of being embarked on “a return to the origins of material, sort of a 
dematerialization of refined matter” (Lippard 1977, 87). He was not seeking a concept, but a 
material reality, one which is both mirrored by and mirrors the mind that is part of it. The 
more militant Conceptual artists, as Peter Osborne has recently pointed out, sought to 
eliminate the aesthetic dimension of art (2013, 47–51). Smithson was not among them. In 
fact, he rejected an art dissolved into ideas, for the reason that “it only deals with the mind 
and it has to deal with the material too.” (Lippard 1977, 89). If Post-conceptual art, which 
Osborne argues is how contemporary art is best categorised, has given up on Conceptual 
art’s idealism, then the return of an aesthetic dimension was nonetheless an achievement 
of Conceptual art, in as much as, in failing to rid itself of it, conceptualism “demonstrated 
the ineliminability of the aesthetic as a necessary, though radically insufficient, component 
of the artwork” (Osborne 2013, 49). It is necessary, in Osborne’s view, as “all art 
requires some form of materialization; that is to say, aesthetic – felt, spatio-temporal – 
presentation.” (2013, 48). Yet, it is insufficient because Post-conceptual art cannot be 
defined on the basis of its aesthetic form – that is to say, its medium. To do justice to 
Osborne’s substantial theorising of Post-conceptual art would require a different essay from 
the current one. Suffice it to say that he would not countenance a return to 
phenomenology. Nonetheless, his affirmation of the necessity of a “felt, spatio-temporal” 
dimension is indicative of what would make phenomenology’s return into critical discourse 
desirable, just as his recognition that this aesthetic presentation need not be either singular 
or specific indicates a challenge for a phenomenologically-oriented approach. 
The question remains as to what form of phenomenology would be desirable to see return. 
The second aspect in Smithson that should give us reason for reconsidering a 
phenomenological perspective also helps on this count, as the mirroring of mind and matter 
on which the artist speculated echoes the late Merleau-Ponty’s talk of the intertwining of 
sensing and the sensed. Smithson envisaged the interaction of mind and matter as an 
apocalyptic maelstrom, the one folding into the other in an infinite and abyssal regress. But, 
this is not a purely intellectual notion; Smithson is describing an experience of infinity. When 
Merleau-Ponty writes that the “veritable infinity” is not the negation of being but “infinity of 
the Lebenswelt and not infinity of idealisation” (1968, 169), the proximity between him and 
Smithson starts to become apparent. The lifeworld (Lebenswelt) for Merleau-Ponty is 
precisely that ground in which subject and object, self and other, sensed and sensing are 
intertwined with one another such that neither can, alone, found the possibility of the 
other. Without wanting at all to conflate Smithson’s artistic stance with Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position, I wonder whether there is not perhaps greater affinity between the 
disorientation of entropy the former evoked and the pre-objective world that the latter 
sought to expose than would at first appear when judged both by Smithson’s own attitude 
to phenomenology and by phenomenological criticism’s historical eclipse at the moment his 
work emerges. The reason for this eclipse, and the possibility that it is based on an 
inadequate reception of phenomenology, is a large part of that with which the current 
paper will occupy itself. It does this, as I say, because my purpose is to explore the possibility 
of engaging phenomenology again within in art theory. To do so, starting from where 
phenomenology sank behind art’s critical horizon seems as good a point as any. 
One aspect of Conceptual and Post-conceptual art that presents a challenge to 
phenomenology is that it is not, for the most part, identical with any singular aesthetic 
object. The work of artists like Smithson or a British contemporary such as Richard Long, and 
of contemporary artists for whom that generation has been a decisive influence like Francis 
Alÿs, is often dispersed across various media. Ultimately, Conceptual and Post-conceptual 
practice is not unified within a single object, but might appear as a photograph at one point, 
a text the next and as film or happening further on. The walking that plays a large role in the 
practices of Long and Alÿs is symptomatic. It is integral to their work, but cannot be 
presented as an object for contemplation, or even as a situation that can be participated in 
apart from at the moment in which it happens. Long’s practice, for example, has had as its 
consistent centre of gravity since the late 1960s the treks he performs through landscapes in 
various parts of the world. This walking may be represented by a photograph or a map, a 
series of words or a sculpture made of materials collected along the walk’s course, but none 
of these tangible products are in their own right ‘the work’. The latter exists as the link 
between each of these discrete instances, linking the visible and legible indices of the work 
to the walk, which, though physical while it happens, is, as Long notes, “afterwards invisible” 
(Long 2007, 26). 
Walking or travel has had a similar status in Alÿs’s work. For his piece The Loop (1997), the 
artist travelled from Mexico, where he lives, to San Diego for the exhibition that had 
commissioned the work. He did so, however, by circumnavigating the globe, crossing 
Australia and Alaska on the way, to get to the U.S. and nonetheless avoid crossing the 
Mexican-U.S. border. The piece was recorded in the form of a simple map of his route hung 
on the wall, and in the format of a postcard, appropriately enough, handed out to visitors 
and bearing an image of an ocean, the curvature of the globe just perceptible on its horizon 
but no land visible, and below it a brief text describing the work. Often Alÿs describes the 
form his work aspires to exist in as rumour. He has spoken of endeavouring to create “a very 
schematic structure” in his work, “so that the project can travel as a rumour or story even 
while the event or performance is happening.” Viewers should be able to “imagine it 
without having to witness it ‘live’, or having access to visual documentation” (Alÿs et 
al. 2004, 81). Like Long, then, who has written that “the freedom to use precisely all degrees 
of visibility and permanence” is important to his practice, Alÿs wants to detach the work 
from a specific moment of perceptual encounter, for which reason it is “composed of 
episodes, metaphors and parables” (Ferguson 2007, 11). Shot through with invisibility and 
absence, dispersed across space and time, not to mention across the diversity of media they 
may employ from the photograph to ‘rumour’, these practices clearly stretch the resources 
of a phenomenology that focuses on an embodied, direct perception of the object, which, as 
we will see, was the most prevalent art critical understanding of phenomenology 
contemporary with the rise of Conceptual art. So, we need to ask whether there is another 
phenomenology that might be more appropriate. 
I will suggest that it is within the late Merleau-Ponty that an alternative may be sought. 
Jean-François Lyotard, who was more obviously and openly influenced by Merleau-Ponty 
than most well-known French philosophers of his generation, wrote that “Merleau-Ponty 
would not have been a great commentator on Cézanne if ‘Cézanne’s doubt’ hadn’t been his 
own.” (1991, 187). Merleau-Ponty’s essay “Eye and Mind,” published a couple of decades 
after his first substantial foray into aesthetics in “Cézanne’s Doubt,” moved on to discussing 
an artist, Paul Klee, whose art is more clearly detached from the nineteenth-Century 
Realism that Cézanne’s was still working through. Nonetheless, the analyses in this later 
essay are still far being such that they could be readily extended to either Conceptual or 
Post-conceptual art. What was it, then, that Lyotard was indicating Merleau-Ponty shared 
with Cézanne? Perhaps the ability and propensity to decompose the perceived into the 
event of perception. The latter, perception, as Lyotard noted in an earlier work, “Merleau-
Ponty strenuously placed … under the authority of the body” (2011, 55). Indeed “it is the 
body and it alone,” Merleau-Ponty writes in The Visible and the Invisible, “that can bring us 
to the things” (1968, 136). “The thickness of the body,” more precisely, is “the sole means I 
have to go unto the heart of the things” (135). So, Lyotard was right, in as much as the body 
as “an exemplar sensible” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 135) is of central importance to Merleau-
Ponty’s account of perception to the end, just as perception itself is to his ontology. This 
thread of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, though an integral part with fundamental importance to 
his way of doing phenomenology, is nonetheless not a promising place to pick up at for 
current art theory. This is because embodied perception was central to, and perhaps 
overemphasised in, the reception of phenomenology within Minimalist criticism in the mid-
1960s, after which ‘phenomenological experience’ falls into neglect as the emphasis shifts 
from perception and the body to language and idea as the decade unfolded. 
But, this is to read Merleau-Ponty’s late work in light of his earlier Phenomenology of 
Perception, rather than the earlier in light of the later work. When we do the latter, we 
notice that in The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty sees the body as but an exemplar; 
it is only a “variant” of the flesh, “that carnal being, as a being of depths,” even if it is “a very 
remarkable one” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 136). What changes in the late work, is that 
sentience and the sensed cease to repel one another as if they were two theoretical 
magnets and become, instead, both referred to being, of whose ‘thickness’ or ‘depth’ they 
are two variants. This new constellation is clearest in ‘The Intertwining’ chapter of The 
Visible and the Invisible, wherein the author writes that “belongingness to one same 
‘consciousness’” is not “the primordial definition of sensibility,” which we should rather 
understand as “a carnal adherence of the sentient to the sensed and the sensed to the 
sentient” (1968, 142). As the end of ‘The Intertwining’ chapter shows, Merleau-Ponty 
envisaged a revised integration of language and cultural forms with perception within this 
new ontology. He did not follow up on this suggestion, his work on the book being broken 
off before he could; however, he had been laying the groundwork for some time, starting in 
the essay “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence” some 10 years before. It is this 
development, picked up and elaborated upon over recent decades (for example, in Renaud 
Barbaras’s phenomenology of life and of desire and Ted Toadvine’s eco-phenomenology), 
that with its potential for integrating the discussion of culture, language and history with 
that of perception, indicates, I suggest, the sort of phenomenology required. 
2. Conceptual Art After Phenomenology 
The Conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth published a now famous article in 1969 entitled “Art 
after Philosophy.” The philosophy in question was largely Logical Positivism. Kosuth’s article 
was an attempt to define what was ‘conceptual’ about Conceptual art, and both to extend 
the idea of art as idea to all art per se, as well as to designate those practices that 
transformed an essential in itself conceptualism of art generally into a strong, for itself, 
Conceptual practice. The somewhat strident views expounded in Kosuth’s article were not 
fully subscribed to by any of the other key figures at the time, and, although the 
argumentation is certainly not without interest, the essay has received its fair share of 
theoretical critiques over the years, including those to be found in Thierry de Duve’s Kant 
After Duchamp and Rosalind Krauss’s A Voyage on the North Sea. Strident or not, Kosuth’s 
thesis was, in one point, not particularly partisan. It reflects the general view held by 
Conceptual artists and their apologists that phenomenology was largely irrelevant to art – 
irrelevant, at least, to the art they made or espoused. Kosuth is explicit on this point. Right 
at the outset, in his second paragraph, he writes that “‘continental’ philosophy need not 
seriously be considered here,” specifying in a footnote “existentialism and phenomenology” 
as the continental philosophies he is setting aside (Kosuth 1999, 159). The one philosopher 
mentioned by name in this footnote is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
For Kosuth’s milieu, Merleau-Ponty’s name was almost synonymous with phenomenology. 
His Phenomenology of Perception was first published in English translation in 1962 and it is 
to this book, either directly or indirectly, that most allusions to ‘phenomenology’ by artists 
and critics in the United States during the remainder of the decade can be referred. The key 
delineations of Merleau-Ponty’s book are very clearly the basis for Robert Morris’s 
argument in his essay “Notes on Sculpture, Part II,” first published in 1966. Firstly, Morris 
argues that the object of sculpture is relative to the perception of the viewer, who is to be 
conceived as a situated and embodied subject. Secondly, the sculpture is considered to be a 
function of the total situation it is encountered within, which includes lighting and 
positioning. “Notes on Sculpture” is, beside another sculptor’s essay, Donald Judd’s “Specific 
Objects,” arguably the most important manifesto of Minimalist art; it proselytises for an art 
based on the body, its movement and situation, just as Phenomenology of Perception argues 
that perception, transcendence towards the world, is to be traced back to the embodied 
subject engaged in its tasks. The discovery of Merleau-Ponty by contemporary critics 
Annette Michelson and Michael Fried seems to have preceded Morris’s, though Morris 
seems to have been the only exponent of Minimalist sculpture to have actually read the 
philosopher’s work (Meyer 1998, 178); and it was Morris’s recourse to phenomenology that 
was soon followed up by sympathetic critics, prominent among whom was Rosalind Krauss. 
In her article “Allusion and Illusion in Donald Judd,” published in the same year and same 
journal as Morris’s “Notes on Sculpture, Part II,” Krauss was already using phenomenology 
as an analytical tool. The culmination of her efforts to bring Merleau-Ponty together with 
Minimalism came a decade later, however, in her first major work, Passages in Modern 
Sculpture, which, as Hal Foster put it, “gives us a minimalist history of modernist sculpture” 
(Foster 1996, 42) stretching 50 or so years from Auguste Rodin’s “Gates of Hell” to Morris 
himself, alongside Robert Smithson, Richard Serra and Michael Heizer in its final chapter. 
Again, it is Phenomenology of Perception among Merleau-Ponty’s writings that is most 
commonly referenced by Krauss during this stage of her career. Her reading of that work is 
largely congruent with the use Morris makes of it, but with one significant difference. On 
the one hand her interpretation seems to be a classical reading of Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology, in as much as she talks of phenomenology having re-characterised 
“perception as a function of intentionality, as the simultaneous cause and result of the 
viewer’s prise sur le monde” (Krauss 1981, 262). On the other hand, Krauss reads the 
sculpture to which she applies phenomenology as effecting a radical de-centering of the 
subject. If Krauss sees this de-centering as being congruent with Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology, as indeed she seems to, then the version of the book she gives us is 
unconventional. A subjectivity that is defined as an intentional grasping of the world is more 
centered than not, even if it is defined as finding itself in its activity in the world, as it is in 
Merleau-Ponty’s book. Indeed, while one can find support for a notion of de-centered 
subjectivity in Phenomenology, the perceptual subject presented in that book as a whole is a 
unified one. Let us be clear, however: it is not that Krauss misunderstands the book, but that 
she seems to be projecting its analyses and themes into another interpretative context. 
Krauss’s discussion of Michael Heizer’s Double Negative (1969) is symptomatic. Heizer’s 
earthwork, consisting of two ramps cut into opposite sides of a ravine in Nevada, is vast: 
almost half a kilometre in length from one side of the valley to the other. It offers no visual 
figure for the viewer on the ground and, so, as Krauss says, “the only means of experiencing 
the work is to be in it.” Here, we are not far at all from Morris’s phenomenology: the work is 
constituted for him, too, in the interaction between the viewer and the object. “We can only 
stand in one slotted space and look across to the other,” Krauss writes, and continues: 
“Indeed it is only by looking at the other that we can form a picture of the space in which we 
stand” (1981, 280). This last sentence is key to Krauss’s phenomenological interpretation of 
sculpture and, indeed, to her interpretation of phenomenology. In terms of the reading of 
sculptural practice, the work is seen as coming into being in the viewer’s encounter with the 
object, but crucially at the expense of the autonomous identity of both. In terms of 
phenomenology’s interpretation, as the viewers discover themselves through the other 
(that is to say, through the object and the others’ viewpoints of it), intersubjectivity comes 
to displace subjectivity. Krauss goes as far as to describe Double Negative as a metaphor for 
“the self as it is known through its appearance to the other.” This is an inversion of the 
classic Husserlian understanding of the other apprehend via “analogical appresentation”; 
that is, the other known through analogy with the self. This account of the other is already 
critiqued by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception, in the chapter entitled 
“Others and the Human World,” wherein he says that “reasoning by analogy presupposes 
what it is meant to explain” (2012, 368). The argument implied here is that analogy, though 
it might be able to loan the other the appearance of being a self, cannot establish it 
as other. The identity of the self cannot function as an analogy for the other’s alterity. So, 
here it is the alterity of the other that Merleau-Ponty is saying is apparently explained and 
yet actually presupposed. Eventually, this critique of Husserl will move from the margins to 
the centre of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. The priority of intersubjectivity that will emerge 
in the later work, however, had not yet been made explicit in his Phenomenology, where the 
subject’s interaction with their environment is, for the most part, presented as constituting 
it as a world of phenomena for a subject that is largely unified in its embodied existence. 
In the late 1970s Krauss wrote a string of essays on photography and Surrealism, in which 
psychoanalysis and semiotics came to displace phenomenology. At this time, she was just 
starting to hone a notion of the unconscious that would eventually be brought back to bear 
critically on certain phenomenological themes in her work from the early 1990s on. This is at 
least part of the context that Krauss anticipates in her slightly eccentric reading 
of Phenomenology. In her 1983 essay “Richard Serra, a Translation,” however, she returned 
to the phenomenological themes and exposition developed in her earlier book. Central to 
this essay is another work that is sited, like Heizer’s Double Negative, in the landscape. 
Richard Serra’s Shift (1970–1972) consists of around a quarter of a kilometre of concrete 
walls that zig-zag down an undulating field in Canada. The top of each wall is level, but 
eventually disappears within the swell of the terrain, across the crests of which the walls 
form a series of parallel tangents. The position of the walls was determined by the course 
Serra and a companion walking down the field took while trying to keep one another in 
sight, so that the resulting work is plotted from the way in which one part of the terrain is 
revealed as the viewer moves across it while another part is concealed. The viewer’s 
movement in relation to the structure is, thereby, made the subject of the work, although it 
is only ‘present’ as a background against which the relation between the land, the walls, and 
the viewer’s body is perceived. Shift is then a work that, again, can only be experienced 
when the viewer is moving through and around it, i.e. while they are physically 
encountering it: the work was conceived, Krauss succinctly puts it, “as a network of 
perspectives that … would constantly define one’s vision of the object in terms of one’s 
relation to it” (Krauss 1985, 267). When Krauss then describes Serra’s sculpture as having 
the “chiasmic trajectory” between seer and seen as its subject, she in effect makes explicit 
the radicality of her reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology (Krauss 1985, 270). 
Although nowhere in Krauss’s writings of this period does she, to my knowledge, mention 
Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished last book The Visible and the Invisible, her use of the term 
‘chiasmic’ makes it clear that she is reading the Phenomenology in light of Merleau-Ponty’s 
later work, because the ‘chiasm’ is a concept that Merleau-Ponty had not yet settled on in 
the earlier book. This later ontology, in which sensing and the sensed are mutually 
implicated within one another, would seem, therefore, to be the other part of the context 
into which Krauss recasts the embodied subject of Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work. The art 
works to which she applied such ideas, however, were ones in which an embodied viewer 
and their direct, active perception was foremost: the work as object is perceived as literally 
present, just as the viewer experiences their own presence in relation to it. At least, this 
would be a relatively standard reading of Minimalism; but Krauss insinuates an absence into 
the heart of this presence, one that sets up and sustains it. Although Krauss abandoned 
phenomenology as she moved her focus to other forms of practice and other critical goals, 
we may ask whether the chiasmic relationship between absence and presence she started 
to outline within Heizer and Serra’s work might not also be adapted to ‘dematerialised’ 
practices. 
3. The Rejection of Phenomenology 
In part, Morris’s interest in the moving body of the viewer in relation to his sculptures came 
from the involvement he had with experimental dance at the time. Later, his then wife, the 
choreographer Yvonne Rainer, spoke of how Minimalism suppressed emotion (Meyer 2009, 
152). This was undoubtedly partly to do with its own repressed roots in Greenbergian 
Formalism, whose search for a proper, if historical, essence to art it unwittingly reproduced 
in attempting to outbid it. Equally, though, phenomenology also tended to bracket feelings 
in an attempt to get to ‘existentials’, as Heidegger called them, the a priori categories of 
experience. Yes, in Being and Time Heidegger famously prioritises feeling (Stimmung, mood) 
ahead of understanding as the basis for our openness to Being. Nonetheless, only the single, 
specific feeling of anxiety is deemed adequate to the task of inaugurating an authentic 
openness for the subject. As Giorgio Agamben (1999) points out, love is not mentioned once 
in Heidegger’s Magnum Opus. Indeed, love, judging by Rainer’s work subsequent to the 
Minimalist moment, is probably not far from what she had in mind when using this word 
‘emotion’; love as a complex emotional relation to another person, to an other. Alterity 
brings me to another exclusion of both Minimalism and phenomenology – at least the 
phenomenology of Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time – namely, 
gender. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein is, as Jacques Derrida (2008) showed, neutral as 
to sexual difference. Given that Heidegger explicitly designates embodiment as secondary 
to Dasein, this is, perhaps, not surprising. More surprising, though, is the absence of any 
serious discussion of gender in Merleau-Ponty’s book seeing as it is account of the primacy 
of embodiment. However, I am digressing. 
What led to Conceptual art’s rejection of phenomenology was not so much questions of 
emotion, or gender or sexual difference, at least not in the first instance, but rather more 
the fact that phenomenological criticism seemed to miss, and not only miss but also actively 
cover over, the ideological structure of the art world. The move to other intellectual 
pastures was motivated by an awareness of what is essentially the same “gap between 
individual and phenomenological experience and structural intelligibility” that, as Fredric 
Jameson notes, had caused realism to lose its critical potential as an aesthetic mode at the 
end of the Nineteenth Century. Jameson continues: “to put it more simply, if in the newly 
decentered situation of the imperialist network, you live something strongly and concretely, 
it is unintelligible, since its ultimate determinants lie outside your own field of experience” 
(Jameson 2007, 241). With Conceptual art this suspicion steadily develops: beyond the 
phenomenologically experienced work of art there are determining structures and 
conditions that remain invisible. In fact, works of art themselves are suspected of concealing 
the framework which subtends them: the work of art is an “illusion,” the French artist 
Daniel Buren wrote in 1970, which “cancels out its viewpoint (the Museum/Gallery) … 
making the latter pass for a vague neutral frame” (Buren 1973, 45). Here it is the self-
effacing structure of ideology, perhaps most influentially summed up in Roland Barthes’s 
early critique of myth delivered in the late 1950s, which is seen to have escaped the 
phenomenological grasp, being as it is beyond direct, perceptual experience. 
“This is what the dominant ideology wants,” Buren wrote, “that what is contained [the work 
of art] should provide, very subtly, a screen for the container [the museum or gallery]” 
(1973, 38). An obvious response to this situation, then, is to get rid of the work of art as a 
discrete and containable, essentially collectable and curatable object, as many artists 
aspired to do at the time. The critic Lucy Lippard was one of the first to recognise this 
tendency, for which she supplied the enduring if contested label ‘dematerialisation’ in an 
article published in 1968 (Lippard and Chandler, 1999). Among the many exhibitions 
mounted during the 6 years referred to in the title of Lippard’s subsequent anthology of 
Conceptual art spanning the years 1966–1972, was one organised in New York by the dealer 
Seth Siegelaub in 1969. January 5–31, 1969, as the show is known, was one of the first 
significant exhibitions focused on the nature of Conceptual art (Osborne 2002, 29). It is also 
one whose form well exemplifies Lippard’s term, as Siegelaub conceived of the catalogue, 
which was composed of a collection of the artists’ statements and photos relating to the 
work, as “primary,” whereas “the physical exhibition,” he said, “was auxiliary to it” 
(Lippard 1977, 125). On the face of it, once art has been ‘dematerialised’, whether it be 
through use of language in the form of instructions, proposals and descriptions of works, or 
through other forms of information (another buzzword of the time), phenomenology was 
no longer relevant to the critical appraisal of these practices as they displaced the situated, 
embodied viewer Morris had in mind. 
Siegelaub included four artists in his 1969 exhibition. One of the four was Kosuth. Another 
was Lawrence Weiner. Eight of Weiner’s works were listed in the catalogue, which itself was 
exhibited in one room during the show while a selection of the textual works the catalogue 
contained were exhibited in material form in another room. Included in both rooms – that is 
to say, included in both the catalogue in its textual form as well as in material form in the 
‘auxiliary’ exhibition – was Weiner’s A 36” x 36” removal to the lathing or support wall of 
plaster or wallboard from a wall (1968). The title here describes precisely what was 
physically manifest in the second room. What is important, however, is that Weiner saw the 
two – textual statement and material realisation – as equivalent. The catalogue also 
contained his “Statement of Intent” in which he wrote, talking of such textual propositions, 
that “the piece need not be built,” thereby implying that the proposal was sufficient itself 
for his ‘piece’, the work, to be said to exist (Alberro 1999, xxii). So it is possible to say, as 
Weiner himself maintained, that, whether it is the textual statement one reads or a physical 
manifestation, whether the statement is read in a catalogue or on a gallery wall, and 
regardless of the physical structure of the wall the work is materialised upon, it is 
the same work (Lippard 1977, 129). 
4. From One Phenomenology to Another 
One way to account for this would be to follow Kosuth and say that Weiner’s work is an 
idea. “Works of art are analytical propositions,” Kosuth wrote, “A work of art is a tautology 
in that it is a presentation of the artist’s intentions, that is, he is saying that a particular work 
of art is art, which means, a definition of art.” (1999, 165). For Kosuth, therefore, it did not 
matter whether the work took the form of a text or object, because ultimately the idea is to 
be received independently of its material form, its ‘morphology’ as he referred to it. This 
conception would clearly lead us, as it did Kosuth, away from a situation in which 
phenomenology could find much resonance or purchase. It is a conception of the work that, 
being founded on the logical operation of self-definition with its aspiration to transparency 
and clarity, would seem to lead inevitably to an attempt to deny or bracket out the 
ambiguity of phenomenal existence. This was unsuccessful, as the failure of Conceptual art 
to eliminate the aesthetic alluded to at the beginning this paper indicates. As a theoretical 
position, it is vulnerable to the same critique Merleau-Ponty applies in The Visible and the 
Invisible to the dichotomies set up by Husserl and Sartre between consciousness and 
being. In this book Merleau-Ponty continued in intensified form his project, begun in 
the Phenomenology, to correct the idealist notion he finds in Husserl of a consciousness that 
“is defined by its presence to itself, its immanence” (Barbaras 2004, 56). If the divide 
between it and being were absolute, in the way such a conception of consciousness would 
imply, then the in itself of being could not become the for itself of consciousness. That is to 
say, conceived of as mutually exclusive opposites, the connection between being and 
consciousness evident in intentionality becomes inexplicable. Merleau-Ponty suggests, 
therefore, that they must rather be conceived as intertwined, each carrying the implication 
and potential of the other within it. Even if, in his subsequent career, Kosuth showed a more 
nuanced approach, in his early essay it is a similar immanence that is envisaged for art to 
that which Husserl envisaged for consciousness. The subsumption of a spatio-temporal form 
under an immaterial idea, and the reduction of the differences between such 
manifestations to the identity of the idea, is a similar idealism. Osborne pinpoints the 
problem with characteristic lucidity, although, as I have already indicated, his is not a 
phenomenological approach: Conceptual artists like Kosuth misconstrued art as having an 
“ideational ontological purity,” and, in as much as they based their own practice on this 
conception, they were labouring under a “self-misunderstanding” (2013, 109). 
Richard Long visited Siegelaub’s January Show and was impressed by Weiner’s work. 
Nonetheless, as Smithson had done, he later distanced himself from the idea of “replacing 
the object with language” (Wallis 2009, 48). Indeed Weiner’s “Statement of Intent” can be 
read this way. It can be understood as claiming that the work and the textual proposition 
are ultimately synonymous. Weiner writes in it that his pieces may be made – by himself or 
someone else – or remain textual statements, all of which are “equal and consistent with 
the intent of the artist.” It does, indeed, sound as if he were saying that the statement is 
sufficient in itself, its realisation being merely ‘auxiliary’. Weiner spoke in another context of 
using language “in an attempt to get across only the content, in the most concise package,” 
and yet it is not at all certain that Weiner’s work actually replaces “the object with 
language” (Lippard 1977, 130). Take, for example, Weiner’s work Many colored objects 
placed side by side to form a row of many colored objects, 1979, which has been realised 
repeatedly over the years in vinyl, neon or painted lettering inside galleries or in exterior 
spaces. Firstly, and most obviously, Weiner’s text, whether printed on a page or stencilled 
on a wall, is an object, a row of letters, and it refers to itself as such. It alludes then to the 
fact that “the transcendence of the sign toward [its] sense,” as Barbaras writes, “never 
abolishes the sign’s materiality, never reaches a transparent meaning” (2004, 53). Weiner’s 
words, as all written words, not only refer beyond themselves and derive their ability to do 
so from belonging to a linguistic system, but are also material inscriptions with phenomenal 
thickness. Secondly, Weiner’s text also, as again all language arguably does, bears a 
reference to a phenomenal world, even if that world is no more than potential. The very fact 
that the letters forming the words of the statement could also themselves count as “colored 
objects placed side by side” makes the irreducible referential potentiality of language, as 
well as that referentiality’s ambiguity, apparent. 
The use of language, text as a medium, has nonetheless been seen as central to 
conceptualism’s attempt to distil art’s “ideational ontological purity.” However, despite the 
impression of transparency it can at times produce, language is not synonymous with ideas, 
which is borne out by this reading of Weiner’s Many colored objects. Indeed, in “Indirect 
Language and the Voices of Silence” Merleau-Ponty spoke of “an opacity of language.” What 
he meant by this phrase was that “nowhere does [language] stop and leave a place for pure 
sense” (2007b, 244). There is no direct presentation of sense in language, pure or otherwise, 
because the sense of signs is always absent where they are present. It is absent from the 
sign inasmuch as when we are looking for the sense of signs we must go elsewhere, whether 
it be to their syntax or context, or the background system, or usages out of which they arise 
as meaningful signs. It follows that if by ‘idea’ such a ‘pure sense’ as Merleau-Ponty spoke of 
is meant, then text cannot be its repository. Indeed, much and possibly the preponderance 
of Conceptual art that takes textual form plays with the ambiguity of language as well as its 
materiality, the Belgian conceptualist Marcel Broodthaers being surely the ironic master in 
this respect. Weiner’s use of language too seems to revel in the medium’s suggestive 
vagueness and its opacity. So, rather than loading the identity of the work into the 
linguistically expressed idea, his ‘Statement of Intent’ could also simply, and equally well, be 
read as putting all degrees and variety of realisation on an equal footing. When Long 
subsequently says that “knowledge of my actions, in whatever form, is the art” he is, 
consciously or not, echoing this alternate reading of Weiner (Long 2007, 26). 
At this point, it is worth recalling that for Merleau-Ponty an object, or rather a 
phenomenon, is not at all a definite thing but, rather, is inherently ambiguous. In this 
respect at least, language and phenomena are not ultimately distinct. Both are 
characterised by a comparable incompletion. From Merleau-Ponty’s point of view then it is 
possible to say that Weiner is not wrong when, in conversation with Siegelaub and the other 
artists in latter’s January Show, he refers to the infinity of language (Lippard 1977, 132). A 
sign, a word, is incomplete in itself and cannot, therefore, “be conceived of as a positive 
entity” (Barbaras 2004, 52), because it is a compound of presence and absence. The 
meaning of each present word is established against a background of language that is 
absent; it is this background that constitutes the word as meaningful, though it be as 
intangible itself as the material word is demonstrably present. “The sign,” as Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, “makes sense only insofar as it is profiled against other signs,” and its sense exists 
only in the form of a horizon toward which the sign tends (2007b, 244). Although the sense 
of the sign does not emanate from within it – although, that is to say, its sense is not 
immanent to it – a sign’s sense is nonetheless intrinsic to its identity as sign. As well as 
alluding to something very close to this in his reference to language’s infinity where “there 
is no edge,” Weiner also contrasts it, however, to the material discreteness of objects, his 
examples being paintings and picture frames (Lippard 1977, 131). Undoubtedly, there is a 
distinction to be made between words and things, between the word ‘painting’ and a 
particular painting by Cézanne, say. In terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
perspective, however, it is not a distinction between something infinite and immaterial on 
the one hand and a finite and material positivity on the other, as Weiner seems to imply. 
The compound of presence and absence found in the sign is also to be found in the 
phenomenon. 
In the The Visible and the Invisible perception is no longer presented, if it ever was in 
Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work, as the intending of a unified noema. Rather, each apparently 
discrete perception is seen as being actually “a certain node in the woof of the simultaneous 
and the successive” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 132). Merleau-Ponty takes as an example a direct 
perception of redness, which turns out to be constituted of a network of other potential 
reds and red things. The directness of the perception, therefore, becomes at the least 
complicated by its implication with potential perceptions: it is not “a quale, a pellicle of 
being without thickness” but, rather, “emerges from a less precise, more general redness” 
(1968, 131). Each discrete perception Merleau-Ponty thinks of as having this halo of sense, a 
virtual linkage with other potential perceptions, hence, “this red is what it is only by 
connecting up from its place with other reds about it, with which it forms a constellation” 
(1968, 132). Without this absent horizon, the present perception would not be what it is. It 
would indeed not be at all: each perception is ‘animated’ by a sense (it is red, a tree, and so 
on); it has an aspect, and without this it would not even be perception, let alone this 
particular perception. So, in Merleau-Ponty’s later thought language loses its claim to the 
ideal transparency and phenomena theirs to unalloyed presence. At this point 
phenomenology as it was understood in the context of Minimalism has been surpassed. 
Let us get back to Weiner. It was necessary to point out that his statements are objects 
despite their textual form and, also, to add that equally as words they are not objects, if by 
that are meant literal, material presences. Now, we can go a further step and say that 
material objects themselves in their meaningful appearance are also more than merely 
present objects. Even as objects given to vision, their meaningful appearance is reliant on a 
sense that is not present in them or finite. (In the case of art objects, this absent horizon of 
sense is more salient than in everyday perception as the background they come into being 
against is necessarily historical.) On this ontological level, the level of sense, Weiner’s 
statements would indeed be the ‘same’ as their materially realised counterparts. While his 
text works derive much of their effect from their referential ambiguity, and despite this 
being undoubtedly distinct (in ways I will not elaborate on here) from the perceptual 
ambiguity one experiences when encountering sculptures such as those of Serra or Heizer, 
both text and object produce an experience neither clear nor obscure, neither fully present 
and immediate nor entirely general and abstract. Perceptual and linguistic horizons are 
different, but the compound of presence and absence remains on an ontological level. One 
thing that perhaps could be said in this context about their difference is that Weiner’s works 
are not synonymous with their medium in the way that Minimalist objects seem to be. This 
notwithstanding, is it not possible to think about Weiner’s work, or that of other Conceptual 
and Post-conceptual artists, in this revised phenomenological framework? If so, it will 
because it is significantly distinct from that of classical phenomenology. It will no longer be 
focused on the constitution of the world in the intentional acts of consciousness, even if the 
job of constitution, as with the earlier Merleau-Ponty taken up by the likes of Morris and 
Krauss, migrates to the body’s intentional grasp of the world. 
One of phenomenology’s most significant discoveries, it is often said, was that made by 
Edmund Husserl of the transcendental nature of intentionality. That is to say, the noema (or 
sense) is not of the same order as the thing that appears in it (the sensed). The bracketing of 
the latter allowed the former to be shown as the form of its appearance. This is the result of 
the Husserlian reduction: to split the intending from the intended. However, Merleau-
Ponty’s late philosophy, Barbaras tells us, “proceeds entirely from the decision to 
reconceive intentionality as an originary ‘reality’, to recognise the irreducible and in some 
way unrendable character of the intentional fabric” (2004, 170). Rather than sense, 
therefore, being conceived as being entirely on the side of consciousness, giving form and 
identity to the inert intended thing, in the late Merleau-Ponty it is thought of as being 
woven with the sensible (Barbaras 2004, 163). The nature of this intertwining of sense and 
the sensible, however, is that sense is presented in the sensible as “a certain absence”: “the 
sense of sense lies in never being present in person,” Barbaras writes (163; 52). As we have 
seen, sense is thus a horizon that must remain elusive and absent so as to be itself, just as 
the phenomenon must continue to unfold towards its absent horizons so that it can be what 
it is. In sum then, sense as horizon, as Merleau-Ponty thinks it, is what both enables the 
phenomenon to appear and keeps its appearing from completing itself, whereas in Husserl, 
on the contrary, the noema is conceived as a “unity of sense” (Barbaras 2004, 51; 171). In 
the picture supplied by late Merleau-Ponty the world’s sense is not forged in the crucible of 
the intending subject, nor in the body’s intentional grasp; if intentionality is able to give 
sense, it is because it has already received it. 
In Discourse, Figure, which contains his most extensive reckoning with Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought, Lyotard spoke at one point of walking “the same path as Merleau-Ponty, but in the 
opposite direction” (2011, 54). That is to say, rather than attempting to show that language 
can be related to the thickness of the phenomenal world beyond it, Lyotard meant to show 
in his book how phenomenal distance (“the beyond-Logos”) already inhabits language 
undermining its transparency. It should be clear by now that, even if not explicit in Merleau-
Ponty’s late work, such an approach does not seem to be entirely at odds with the ontology 
it puts forward and the analyses it contains. Lyotard also clearly had sympathy for 
phenomenology’s aim of going “beneath the realist view of the constituted or the given” 
and in particular Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to do so, even if he believed that “sooner or later 
one will have to give up phenomenologizing if one wants to reach … this something that is 
not constitutable.” In place of phenomenology, it was what he termed “deconstruction” 
that was needed (Lyotard 2011, 54–5). Perhaps what makes it possible to say that Merleau-
Ponty is still doing phenomenology in The Visible and the Invisible and related texts is not 
only that he is not performing a deconstruction of conceptual oppositions as Lyotard does, 
but that he seeks to reappraise and refashion such phenomenological concepts as 
intentionality. In his late essay on Husserl, “The Philosopher and his Shadow,” he speculates 
on how the ontological approach he is now taking to “unveil the pretheoretical layer,” which 
he likens to an “archaeology,” might transform phenomenology’s core concepts: “Does it 
make no changes at all in our conception of noesis, noema, and intentionality – in our 
ontology? After we have made this descent, are we still entitled to seek in an analytics of 
acts what upholds our own and the world’s life without appeal?” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 
165). This is, indeed, a big change from Husserl and his own Phenomenology, where 
intentionality is by and large explored as a subjective act. 
As we have seen, in his late work Merleau-Ponty has moved on from thinking of 
intentionality as being explicable finally as the subject’s grasp of the world. It is certain that 
he no longer thought of the world as primarily constituted in our intentional acts, as these 
themselves had a background, the soil of the lifeworld, that was “not constitutable” in 
them. Ultimately, going back to follow up the ramifications of these two simply stated 
conceptual developments, largely missed in Merleau-Ponty’s reception within Minimal and 
denigration in Conceptual art theory, is what is required to re-establish phenomenology’s 
relevance for Post-conceptual art. Merleau-Ponty spoke of the need to renounce “the 
bifurcation of the ‘consciousness of’ and the object,” which the Husserlian concept of 
intentionality implies (1968, 141). What he refers to as the ‘consciousness of’ here is 
intentionality conceived of as immanent to the subject and founded on an ideal “unity of 
sense” independent of any actual object. So might we not, if we were to take up again and 
elaborate upon Merleau-Ponty’s alternative version of intentionality and its rejection of an 
immanent, unified sense, be walking in the same direction as Smithson and his rejection of 
“facile” ideas of “gestalt unity” in the ontology of the work of art, too? 
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